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I propose to defend the thesis that psychological states can be literally ascribed only to living creatures and not to nonliving machines, such as sophisticated robots.  The claim that life is necessary to mind I will label the LNM Thesis.  My theme is that defenders of machine consciousness do not sufficiently appreciate the importance of the biological nature of a subject for the psychological significance of its behavior.  They too readily assume that whether or not the alleged subject is an organic living subject is irrelevant and that the simulations of a computer-controlled, nonliving autonomous robot could, at least potentially, carry the same psychological meaning as the behavior of a living human being.  In opposition, The LNM Thesis maintains that designing an android so that it exhibits behavior characteristic of anger, joy, pain, or pleasure, does not thereby provide the appropriate underlying psychological motivations that we find in human beings, even when that behavior is controlled by “the right” functional systems.  Being a living creature is an essential link between genuinely expressive behavior and justified psychological ascriptions.
	The ascription of psychological states to a subject is based on “animate behavior,” which is the behavior of a living human being or animal. Although the etymology of the word ‘animate,’ derives from the ideas of breath, soul, and spirit, all of which convey unacceptably dated and dualistic notions, I use the term only to call attention to the sorts of movements and actions that are within the control of living human beings and animals.​[2]​  We speak of “animated” drawings and figures that portray objects, such as Pinocchio or Wall-e as lifelike, but these simulations do not support genuine psychological ascriptions since they are not really alive.  The focus of "animate behavior" is on actions that are in a general sense voluntary and purposive, as opposed to tics and spasms, although reflex movements may at times be part of a person’s expressive behavior, as, for example, when someone winces and pulls back from a hot utensil.  Animate behavior is psychologically expressive because it arises out of the biological needs, interests, and concerns that develop naturally in animals and human beings.  Understanding this background allows us to understand the beliefs, desires, and purposes that motivate their behavior.
	The conception of animate behavior plays a role in our understanding of mind like that played by what David Armstrong has called “behavior proper,” in contrast to “physical behavior.”  When he explains his analysis of a mental state as a “state of the person apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour,” he makes it clear that he employs in this formula a concept of “physical behavior” that refers exclusively “to merely physical actions or passions of the body.”​[3]​  He claims that if he used “behaviour proper,” which implies a relationship to the mind, he would be giving an account of mental concepts in terms that “already presuppose mentality, which would be circular.”  To formulate a legitimate reduction of the mental to the physical he believes he must employ the concept of purely physical behavior, which is devoid of psychological implications.
	However, as Anita Avramides points out, by using a reduced conception of behavior Armstrong opens up a conceptual and epistemological gap between physical behavior and “inner mental states” that is impossible to bridge.  She suggests that we can avoid this problem by appealing to a concept of behavior that is “not simply the physical movement of limbs; it is the action of a subject.  The crucial point is that behaviour proper is the behaviour of a subject that is comprehensible to other subjects.” ​[4]​  It is behavior that can be “read” for its psychological significance, so that we are left with neither a problem about the unity of minds and behavior nor an epistemological problem about the existence of other minds.  Her appeal to “behavior proper” also sensibly restricts the attribution of mind to human beings and certain animals “whose behavior is comprehensible to us.” With respect to the charge that using this rich notion of behavior is circular or begs the question about the existence of other minds, she responds that “an acceptance of the way our concept of mind is bound up with the concept of behaviour proper is one way of rejecting” the Cartesian framework that leads to skepticism.  Armstrong’s attempt to avoid circularity simply plays into Cartesian hands by introducing an alleged gap between inner mental states and outer physical behavior, which she insists is “spurious” (272).  The concept of “animate behavior” to which I appeal in defending the LNM Thesis plays much the same role in providing an effective basis for the ascription of psychological states that Avramides assigns to “behavior proper.”  It carries “psychological significance,” at least in its more sophisticated manifestations among human beings and other animals.  At the same time, the concept of “animate behavior” has a special virtue in being clearly empirical, since it rests on determining whether a potential subject is a living organism.
	The relation between mentality and life has not been discussed extensively in the history of philosophy, although there are opposed views on the topic that are noteworthy. For instance, Gareth Matthews has called attention to the way “Descartes sought to break the conceptual connection between being conscious and being alive.”​[5]​  He held “that the principle by which we are nourished is wholly distinct from that by means of which we think,” which he called the mind.​[6]​  According to him the immaterial mind, although conscious, is not a living thing, and a person is alive only because his body is alive.  Therefore, on the Cartesian view “it does not follow from the fact that something is conscious that it is alive.”​[7]​  Of course, since Descartes’ rejection of the claim that life is required of anything having a mind is founded on his mind-body dualism, this offers no support to physicalists who insist that a nonliving physical body, such as a robot, could be conscious.
	A very different perspective on the controversy is suggested by John Stuart Mill’s famous statement of the inductive reasoning that has come to be known as the argument from analogy for the existence of other minds.  He claims that since he observes in his own case that stimuli occasion outward behavior by way of inner feelings, he can conclude that there must be a similar intermediate link between stimuli and observable behavior in the case of others.  Of special interest is the fact that he describes that crucial intermediate link in terms of those others being alive in contrast to their being nonliving mechanisms. “I must either believe them to be alive, or to be automatons: and by believing them to be alive, that is, by supposing the link to be of the same nature as in the case of which I have experience, and which is in all other respects similar, I bring other human beings, as phenomena, under the same generalizations which I know by experience to be the true theory of my own existence.”​[8]​  Apparently Mill believes that being a living individual and being capable of having experiences like his own track together in an essential way.




In Thinking Clearly About Death, Jay Rosenberg argues that the “specialness” of persons that leads us to bestow certain rights upon them is due to the performance capabilities of the rational beings that they are and not to their possession of some “special thing, a ‘mind’ or ‘soul,’” as dualists have urged.​[9]​   The quality of a subject’s behavior, not its substance, is crucial.  The concept of a rational being is the concept of a being which has the ability or capacity “to speak, reason, deliberate, decide, theorize, learn, and so on.”   We humans count ourselves as persons because we are rational beings capable of “intelligible speech, cogent thought, reliable memory, purposive action, and the like” (116).  To count some being as a person, he says,
is to agree that there are some things which it is not permitted that one do to this entity—buy it or sell it, for instance, arbitrarily lock it in a cage, or shoot it.   To count some being as a person, in short, is to grant to that being the sort of respect and treatment due persons, to acknowledge it as having a certain ethical or moral standing. (115)
	Of special interest is Rosenberg’s claim that “there is nothing in point of logic to prevent some nonanimal—a machine, say—from having and manifesting the same performance capabilities” required of a rational being (114).  “A rational machine would be ‘special’ in exactly those relevant ways that a rational animal is ‘special,’ and what it is made of—protoplasm or metal—or how it originated—birth or manufacture—should be no more important than what color or size it is or where it originated” (114-15).  Limiting “personhood” to rational animals, as an Aristotelian might, can be seen as a “kind of prejudice or bigotry—‘protoplasmic chauvinism.’”  This seems to imply that we would be under moral pressure to respect rational machines as persons and to bestow “human rights” on them as well—not marketing them, caging them, or turning them off.  
	Rosenberg acknowledges that there are no rational machines as yet and that perhaps there never will be.  Nevertheless, he clearly believes they are conceivable, and he is certainly not the only philosopher who believes that this is possible.  Daniel Dennett, for instance, claims that a suitably programmed silicon-based computer brain would be conscious and have a self.  He explains that “It’s not that you can’t imagine a conscious robot; it’s that you can’t imagine how a robot could be conscious.” ​[10]​  This remark suggests that ready endorsements of the theoretical possibility of machine rationality and action stem in part from the apparent ease with which we can imagine an android simulating human behavior.  However, this is an idea that I will take pains to challenge in the discussion that follows.
	Rosenberg sets a rigorous standard of performance capability for a rational or intelligent being to meet.  In an earlier essay entitled “Conversation and Intelligence,” he discusses Joseph Weizenbaum’s development of ELIZA, an amusing computer program that was designed to mimic the conversations between a Rogerian therapist and a client.​[11]​  The software was coded so that it would search the client’s statements for key words, which were then cleverly employed to form the questions, statements, and requests that constituted the computer’s side of the dialogue.  The client was kept engaged by making it appear that ELIZA was producing relevant and helpful responses to what the client said.  It is claimed that people found these exchanges to have therapeutic appeal.  In fact, someone first encountering the program might be tempted to think that the computer is intelligent because it appears to satisfy what Rosenberg calls “The Conversation Principle.”  This Principle, which he endorses, states that “any being with whom intelligent people can carry on a significant conversation must itself be intelligent” (CI 159 and 166).  However, because truly significant one-on-one conversation requires understanding by both parties, the ELIZA-programmed computer does not pass the test.  Although the conversational exchange may be significant to the client who is taken in, the computer system does not understand either what the client is saying or what it itself is “saying.”
	Rosenberg explains that what distinguishes ELIZA from a human therapist is that the latter
says what he does for reasons, in service of determinate therapeutic interests, and in terms of an understanding that embeds his utterances in a structure of purposes as means to ends.  But there is no analogous story to be told about ELIZA here, and this for the simple reason that a computer does not (yet) have needs, goals, interests, purposes or ends.  What’s wrong with ELIZA, then, is not that she doesn’t understand (although I would agree that she doesn’t) but that she doesn’t –and can’t –care (CI 167).
So the computer in this case falls short of exhibiting the performance capabilities necessary to count as something that has cognitive abilities, like thinking, reasoning, and understanding, because it lacks rather more conative capacities, such as having interests, purposes, and goals.
	Rosenberg’s parenthetical interjection of the word ‘yet’ in the remark just quoted, indicates that, despite his doubts about ELIZA, he is in fact open to the possibility that some day computers might be designed with purposes and interests, and consequently be able to reason in service of those interests and even to care.  However, for this he seems to demand more than performance capabilities.  He claims that
the fundamental manifestation of intelligence, cognition or thinking lies, then, as Wittgenstein already suggested, not in any performance or complex of performances, but in a total ‘Lebensform’ –or, perhaps, in deference to the nonliving intelligences of the future, we should say here: in a total ‘Seinsform’.  Inversely and better put, it is only in the context of such a ‘Seinsform’ that one can recognize what performances one is encountering; for the very identity of a performance, so to speak, is a function not only of its content but also of its point.  And the ‘Seinsform’ of some entity, in turn, depends not only on what it does, but also—crucially—on what it is, and on the ways in which its doings harmonize with and answer to the needs and interests of its being (CI 168).	
He notes, for instance, that we are skeptical of “Clever Hans,” the counting horse, because we do not know what a horse does with its alleged mathematical talents; whereas the communications of the signing chimpanzees, Sarah and Washoe, “focus on what are, for them, real and immediate concerns—tickling and automobile rides and bananas.” (167).  According to Rosenberg’s observation we should be particularly interested in seeing what “real and immediate concerns” motivate androids that are produced in the future.	
	Dismissing Turing’s much discussed Imitation Game as a “charming and innocuous” test of genuine intelligence, Rosenberg suggests that to create a truly intelligent computer, engineers would have to produce one that is “not only talkative but self-interested” (CI 168).  That capacity, he says, is likely to be manifested when computers act to further their own interests, and perhaps especially when, like the HAL 9000 computer in the film “2001: A Space Odyssey,” they act in ways that conflict with human interests.  Here he is tapping into our intuition that a machine aiming at domination, or at least independence, will at some point fail to do exactly what it is told.  Of course, in the movie the very human script mellifluously voiced by Douglas Rain artificially enhances the impression that Hal is a person with independent thoughts and feelings. 
	However, in his novel, 2001, which is based upon the screenplay, Arthur C. Clarke makes it clear that Hal, the machine that monitors the spaceship’s life-support systems and that carries out navigational chores, is only a highly advanced computer and is not human.  For instance, he notes that, while the human leader of the expedition to Saturn, David Bowman, looked forward to returning to Earth and enjoying once again the beauties of the tropics receding in the distance from his ship, Hal cared for “none of these things, for it was not human.”​[12]​  This suggests that it cannot care for anything at all, being a mere machine, as the LNM Thesis would have it.  As Clarke explains, “Undistracted by the lusts and passions of organic life,” Hal had worked for the fulfillment of his assigned program “with absolute single-mindedness of purpose” (2001, p.147).  Late in the novel Clarke says of the giant mysterious and monolithic Star Gate waiting near Saturn to engulf Bowman’s space pod, “If it had been alive, it would have felt excitement, but such an emotion was wholly beyond its powers” (2001, p.188).  On the other hand, like some philosophers, Clarke seems to believe that, although life is required for emotion, it is not necessary for thought or even consciousness.  He claims that Hal could easily pass the Turing test and so was capable of thinking by “any sensible definition of the word” (2001, p. 94).  Unlike ELIZA, Hal “understands” verbal commands and carries on conversations with the crew.​[13]​
	Despite Clarke’s expansive view of computer intelligence, it is a misunderstanding to view Hal’s apparent disobedience and actions causing the death of crewmen as either an indication of “deliberate malice,” as Bowman feared, or as an attempt to further interests of its own, as Rosenberg suggests.  Clarke explains that the computer had a mental breakdown as the result of “his program conflicts.”  Although Hal was given full knowledge of the mission’s secret objectives, the computer was not permitted to reveal them to the crew, and this ran afoul of the purpose for which it had been designed—“the accurate processing of information without distortion or concealment.”  The final diagnosis of its misbehavior was that it developed a computer’s analogue of a psychosis.​[14]​  “Hal’s builders had failed fully to understand the psychology of their own creation….” (2001, p. 169).  
	Ironically, Rosenberg’s insights concerning the natural background of interests and concerns against which we understand the psychological motivation of animal behavior provoke serious questions about whether a machine, like Hal, could be designed whose “being” genuinely reflects needs and interests of its own rather than those of its designer. Can a machine’s performance exhibit genuine intelligence if that depends upon its having genuine self-interest?  Can there be such a thing as a robot’s “Seinsform” analogous to the concerns, expressive reactions, and language use that develop as part of a living human being’s natural history?  I will address these questions with the aid of a view that sharply contrasts with Rosenberg’s.

III
Ziff: Nonliving Things Cannot Have Minds
	In a note Rosenberg mentions a brief but provocative paper, “The Feelings of Robots,” in which Paul Ziff dissented from the view that artificial, nonliving machines could exhibit the performance capabilities of genuinely sentient and intelligent beings.  Ziff insisted that automata or computing machines that are artifacts, assemblages of manufactured parts, cannot have feelings precisely because they are “mechanisms, not organisms, not living creatures….  Only living creatures can literally have feelings.”​[15]​   It is contradictory, for instance, to say, when speaking literally, that “The robot feels tired,” because, when you are referring to a robot, you are referring to something that is nonliving.  But the phrase “…feels tired,” is open only to expressions that refer to living creatures (MM 99).  Ziff says similar things about “The robot is conscious,” and about claims that robots could in principle reason or have intentions and purposes (MM 100).  “Robots may calculate but they will not literally reason.  Perhaps they will take things but they will not literally borrow them. They may voice apologies but they will not literally make any” (MM 99).​[16]​  In each case he appears to be contrasting physical performances with intentional actions.
	Ziff does not attempt to define the concept of “life” explicitly in his brief essay.  For the present discussion we can assume that “a living organism” is anything having a sufficient subset of the features that are commonly cited in biology texts as being characteristic of life.  A living thing is typically a self-reproducing, organized system of cells that is capable of nutrition, excretion, growth, responsiveness to stimuli, and locomotion.  Living cells also feature direct origin from pre-existing cells and a full complement of DNA and RNA that is required for development and reproduction.​[17]​  There are borderline cases between living and nonliving things, such as viruses, but this is not troubling to Ziff because the sophisticated machines that are envisaged to be conscious by his opponents are clearly nonliving.​[18]​  
	Ziff’s thesis that life is necessary for mind is semantic, not empirical, which explains his relatively curt defense of his position.  He speaks of certain linguistic environments as being “open” only to expressions referring to living creatures, as though this were a rule of language.  His point is not that creating a conscious machine would be too difficult, too complicated, or too expensive.  What is not alive cannot be said literally to have feelings, any more than this can be said of a stone or the number 17.  Ascribing psychological states to a number simply makes no sense.  It hardly makes more sense to say such things of a stone.  Robots too are nonliving assemblages of metal, plastic, glass, and silicon, materially not unlike a stone.  Ziff is suggesting that we cannot apply psychological talk to an inanimate object, even if it is capable of self-controlled movement, and still mean the same as when we speak of human beings.  If this is correct, then, contrary to Rosenberg’s claims, an entity’s materials and origins do bear on whether it is a legitimate psychological subject.
	One of Ziff’s chief arguments against robotic mentality is that robots do what they are programmed to do.  What a robot does "will depend on the whim of the man who makes it..." (Ziff MM 103).  We could make a robot act tired after lifting a feather or cry out in pain when gently caressed.  If its behavior were that arbitrary it would obviously lack psychological significance. But this would also be true even if it were designed to react more appropriately to cues in its environment. We could make it act like a human in pain when burned and jabbed without succeeding in making this an expression of the robot’s pain.  It might respond appropriately and rationally to its environment and social setting, carrying on useful and informative conversations, without being moved by reasons, interests, and concerns of its own.  It has no reasons, interests, and concerns beyond those of its designers.  Although its behavior can be purposive, it lacks the natural teleology that endows human behavior with convincing motivation.  Reproducing human behavior by means of an electro-mechanical device is not the same as reproducing human psychology.  Ziff sums this up by saying: “There are not psychological truths about robots but only about human makers of robots” (MM102).
	Having outlined these two diametrically opposed views of Rosenberg and Ziff, we may now ask, which of them is correct?  Would ascriptions of psychological states be justified by the “behavior” of appropriately structured physical systems, including nonliving robots with “the right” functional organization?  Or are such ascriptions justified only by animate behavior?
	The LNM thesis challenges the idea that a nonliving machine’s behavior could effectively reproduce--not merely mimic--the expressive actions of a human being so that we would be justified in ascribing psychological states to that machine.  The basis for that challenge is the belief that the significance of the behavior of an active subject depends upon the nature of that subject.  Non-biological artifacts, such as robots, lack needs, interests, and concerns of their own that would impart genuine psychological significance to their behavior.  For the behavior of a subject to have such significance, it must at least be a form of life.  I turn now to some Wittgensteinian observations that are relevant to that thesis. 
IV
Wittgenstein and Animate Behavior
In Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein asks, “What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can feel?”​[19]​  One way to illuminate this question, he thinks, is to contrast living beings--which are capable of self-movement--with inanimate objects. 
Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations.--One says to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing?  One might as well ascribe it to a number!  And now look at a wriggling fly and at once these difficulties vanish and pain seems able to get a foothold here, where before everything was, so to speak, too smooth for it. (PI 284)​[20]​  
It may be too much to suppose that the movement of the fly justifies actually attributing pain to it.  Its body and “face” are not configured in a way that allows us to identify its “wriggling” as an expression of suffering as opposed to, say, a frantic effort to free itself from restraint. Wittgenstein suggests only that the fly’s behavior allows the idea of pain to get a grip.​[21]​
	Why is the fly’s frantic behavior psychologically significant to us, even though the insect is in a sense a physical mechanism?  It cannot be merely because the fly, unlike a stone, moves or wriggles in a certain manner, since that can be simulated in a nonliving artifact.  Instead of a living insect we could be examining a cleverly articulated scarab with tiny “limbs” designed to run on a watch battery so that it can crawl realistically over the tabletop.  If we realize it is not a real beetle, its movements would not provide even a slight “foothold” for a psychological perspective on that behavior.  This suggests that it is not just the fly’s physical motions that are psychologically meaningful to us, but the fact that such behavior is being exhibited by a living, active locus of agency that is aiming for an appropriate end for an insect.  We have a sense that it is trying to fly, trying to get free, where this description carries a modicum of intentional force.  A robot on an assembly line might repeatedly “try” to weld a joint by recycling its routine, and repeatedly fail if the work is not positioned correctly.  However, any frustrated intentions involved belong to those operating the production line.
	What is it about the living insect that makes us think that it is trying to escape restraint, if we do not read this simply from the observed physical motions alone?  It seems that this significance arises from the fact that we know something about what occasions a fly’s behavior, its natural urge to move, to evade capture, and to buzz around a room.  We are sensitive to its unwillingness to suffer confinement, and are aware of its tendency to avoid threat and to search for food.  More generally, a creature’s movements have psychological significance for us because we understand something about its motivations and purposes as a life form.  We know that an animal carries on activities within a setting of needs and resources, fears and wants, and an awareness of this background is important to our being able to understand the aims indicated by its behavior. We regard the basic purposes made manifest in an animal’s life activities, such as seeking shelter, mates, and things to eat, that are essential to its existence and reproduction, as originating naturally with its developing needs and interests as a living organism.  Understanding this background is crucial to regarding the autonomous animal itself as the explanatory locus of its agency.  We do not think of that agency as deriving from some antecedent or external mind, as in the case of robots.
	Wittgenstein’s fly example is telling because the behavior observed is produced by the efforts of a living creature, and only that counts as “animate behavior” for which a type of psychological explanation appropriate to the actions of such a subject is relevant.​[22]​  In the case of a fly the psychology is minimal; in the case of human beings it is extensive.  When living creatures that are more intelligent than a fly are born they are typically immature and have relatively few abilities; but with growth, maturation, and learning they acquire an array of skills by which to survive within their environment.  Such an animal is the result of eons of evolutionary development; but at the same time that genetic heritage provides it with an allotment of intelligence and abilities to use to satisfy its individual wants and aims.  Purposeful animate behavior calls for psychological explanation in terms of what a particular animal sees, hears, smells, feels, and aims at doing.  This requires taking account of the psychologically salient environmental qualities that are epistemologically accessible to an animate subject.  Human beings, unaided by detection devices, can describe their environment in “subjective” terms: visible shapes, colors, heard sounds, tastes, odors, feelings of heat and cold and tactile sensations, as well as what is attractive and what is repellant.  They are able to learn to express verbally phenomenological details of such experiences as a way of explaining their own behavior.  We infer that similar explanations are also true of less articulate creatures that sufficiently resemble us in their expressiveness, or perhaps in the physiological basis for their sensations.
	The operations of machines, on the other hand, are explained in terms of non-psychological factors, such as pressure, wavelengths of light and sound, variations in temperature, the interactions of specific molecules, electrical currents, magnetic fields, as well as computer programming.  Of course, the physical behavior of human beings can also be explained in terms of physical movements and changes in their bodies, but that is not what is called for in explaining animate behavior.  It is also true that engineers may employ psychological labels for various internal configurations of robots that are seen as analogues of human desires and emotions, but that is not to think of such states as representing the full psychological significance of human emotional states. The key point is that animate behavior calls for psychological, not physical, explanation, because the sustained and complex activity that is controlled by animals is explained by the aims, interests, and desires that arise in them as living organisms.  For that reason we should not expect to be able to redeploy psychological language readily and without distortion in the radically different context of machines.​[23]​ 

V
Wittgenstein: What Behaves Like a Living Human Being?
	The following much quoted exchange between Wittgenstein and his alter ego in section 281 of Philosophical Investigations introduces a suggestive discussion of the connection between the behavior of living things and mentality.  
But doesn’t what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?”--It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious (PI 281)
This passage sounds like an endorsement of the LNM thesis. The shift to the formal mode concerning what can be said indicates that the stated requirement is conceptual.  Unfortunately, Wittgenstein does not say explicitly what the phrase “resembles (behaves like) a living human being” covers.  Presumably higher animals should be included; but does it also include the behavior of sophisticated robots?	 
	Oswald Hanfling claims that for Wittgenstein the status of robotic subjects turns on “the extent to which the machine’s behaviour resembles that of a human being, for example in engaging our sympathies.”  Hanfling goes on to say that
we can conceive of artifacts of suitable appearance and behaviour (such as are described in science fiction) which would satisfy this condition—which, indeed, would be indistinguishable from our fellow human beings as far as behaviour is concerned.  Such beings would (we may suppose) participate in the language-games of thought, sensation and consciousness (including, among others, the language-game of lying) just as we all do; and we would use, and need, this vocabulary in our dealings with them.  Whether we would still call them ‘machines’ is another matter. We may suppose that if we did, they would express resentment—just as a human beings would; and similarly if we questioned whether they really felt pain and so on.” ​[24]​
Such a machine might utter words of resentment, but if Ziff is right, this would not express the android’s resentment.  Nor would its being able to “participate” in language-games guarantee the existence of an underlying psychology of thought and sensation.  Hanfling simply assumes that the android’s behavior would have that sort of psychological force.
	That Wittgenstein did not intend the phrase “behaves like” to be so inclusive as Hanfling indicates is suggested by remarks in Philosophical Investigations where he contrasts conscious human beings with nonconscious automatons.​[25]​ Also, in the Blue Book Wittgenstein, like Ziff, avers that a machine’s thinking is not just an impossible feat, but is conceptually out of order.
The question is not analogous to that which someone might have asked a hundred years ago: “Can a machine liquefy a gas?”  The trouble is rather that the sentence, “A machine thinks (perceives, wishes)”: seems somehow nonsensical.  It is as though we had asked “Has the number 3 a colour?”​[26]​
In PI 360 he links this point to section 281:
	But a machine surely cannot think!—Is that an empirical statement? No. We only say of a human being and what is like one that it thinks.  We also say it of dolls and no doubt of ghosts too.  Look at the word “to think” as a tool.
Although these passages seem to favor the LNM Thesis, they call upon intuitions that not all philosophers share, and so citing them is hardly decisive against robot mentality.  
	John Cook’s early account of Wittgenstein’s thought appears more promising in this regard.  He observes that the attack on “private language” was aimed at getting us to see that “if we reject the idea that sensations are, as Hume thinks, individual substances, i.e. objects of ‘inner sense’, and acknowledge that sensations are states of living organisms, then we can allow that words for sensations are tied up with the natural expression of sensations….  There is, then an essential connexion of sensations with living organisms.”​[27]​  Cook adds, “When he [Wittgenstein] says that a sensation is not a something, he is saying that a sensation is not an object of ‘inner sense’, is not something having its essential characteristics apart from a living organism.”​[28]​
	According to Cook, Wittgenstein’s point in PI 281 is that psychological states must be ascribed to a bearer that is capable of psychologically significant expressive behavior.  This is not to endorse analytic behaviorism, but it is to insist that sensations are not to be conceived as merely introspectible items within a body, as though identifiable independently of all connection with behavior.  Thoughts and feelings are not to be conceived as capable of floating free in just any old body--a stone, a cooking pot, or a corpse.​[29]​  That conception derives from a mistaken interpretation of our ability to self-ascribe without observation.  It is perhaps natural to assume that, since a bearer of the right sort must be capable of behavioral expression, it must also be a living subject.  Yet that assumption is not explicitly argued for.  Why would a suitably constituted behaving robot not count, as Hanfling suggests?
	In commenting on PI 281, Anita Avramides notes that “we react to living human beings with our use of [sensation] words, and we also react to some non-human animals that behave in ways that resemble the ways that living human beings behave.”  
She cautions that there is a limit on “how far into the animal kingdom these words may apply, and to the range of such experience words that apply outside the sphere of human interactions.”​[30]​  Can such words extend to the machinations of robots?  Apparently she thinks not. “That we take another to be in pain is quite a natural reaction we have to a certain sort of living being.”​[31]​  She later observes that
We all react quite differently when we come across a robot and when we meet our siblings.  It may be that the robot has been very cleverly designed: at first we are fooled and react to it much in the way that we react to our siblings.  But after a while the robot will do something that changes our attitude.​[32]​
	This last point is disappointingly tendentious, however, because it suggests that the line between mindless robots and minded humans is drawn at inevitable differences in observable behavior.  That claim fails to address Hanfling’s challenging appeal to the android of science fiction whose behavior would be “indistinguishable from our fellow human beings.” ​[33]​  Although it is not clear exactly what that stipulation requires, a lifelike and sociable android would no doubt superficially appear to be capable of human expressions and gestures, even if different from us on the inside.  Presumably it would not ingest food, use sex to reproduce, or bleed and suffer death.  Although this complicates the claim that it behaves as we humans do, it is not obvious that those differences have anything to do with a lack of capacity to think or to feel.  It clearly would have a sophisticated repertoire of “performance capabilities” that appear to satisfy Rosenberg’s criteria for a “rational being.”  After all, it could maintain its end of a plausible conversation, and so by the “Conversation Principle” we would be tempted to accord it high marks for intelligence.  It would perform more like Dr. Phil than like ELIZA.
	Nonetheless, the crucial question is whether such an android really does behave as we do in the respects that matter to the psychological significance of that behavior.  At the very least, if it is not alive, it does not exhibit “animate behavior” of the kind we have always looked for when ascribing psychological states to subjects.  This is not a trivial difference that can be blindly ignored by simply insisting that its behavior is nonetheless indistinguishable from that of a human being.
	One of the goals of robot designers is to replicate human expressions in order to ease robot-human interaction. ​[34]​  That is a desirable and achievable goal.  We can imagine that a lifelike “sociable humanoid robot” turns its head, trains its optical devices upon us, and opens its lips in a “smile.”  It perhaps detects us as familiar shapes, colors, or voices, and indicates this with “facial” changes mimicking a smile.  What is not at all clear is how the robot’s response could be a genuine expression of pleasure at seeing us, if it is not the sort of entity that can participate in social situations through its own naturally arising desires, feelings, and emotions.  Genuine psychological expression in a robot would require more than mimicking behavior in a suitable environment by programming it to act on cue.  The psychological import of that behavior must be reproduced along with the behavior, and accomplishing that in artificial constructions would require reproducing the human and animal motivations lying behind behavior.  It takes the context of a life for gestures and expressions to reflect the appeal of shared interests, caring, mutual concern, affection, and love.  According to Rosenberg, applying fully meaningful psychological explanations to a robot requires that it possess a “Seinsform,” which itself depends “on the ways in which its doings harmonize with and answer to the needs and interests of its being.”​[35]​  The problem with this requirement is that it is not at all obvious how that can be achieved in something that is not alive, that lacks needs and interests—that lacks a Lebensform.  What the concept of “life” represents in the context of the debate about the relation between life and mind is the kind of explanatory motivations that lend psychological meaning and authenticity to behavioral expression.  This claim is not based on prejudice against artifice or on “protoplasmic chauvinism,” but on the necessary relation between animate behavior and psychological explanation.
	Engineers can design and construct devices with all sorts of “performance capabilities,” but it is a large order to expect them to build those devices so that the motivations for the performances arise from the authentic needs and interests of the machines themselves as opposed to those of their makers.  Organisms naturally develop curiosity, interests, and concerns that arise from their very nature as the forms of life that they are.  Food, water, and mates are attractions.  Danger, injury, and hunger are threats.  
	This background of natural needs and interests provides the underpinning for explaining the self-initiated and self-controlled behavior of living agents in psychological terms.  Gestures, actions, and expressions attributed to a living agent have psychological significance calling for explanation in terms of that subject’s intentions, purposes, feelings, desires or aversions.  Human beings, in particular, are able to articulate their own individual purposes, which gives their autonomy as individuals a singular emphasis in our conception of personhood.  In contrast, “autonomous” robot behavior is driven by mechanisms ultimately designed and constructed by living beings, and it is those living beings that have genuine intelligence, intentions, purposes, and desires.
	
VI
Harry, Hubert, and Henrietta
It is true that robots can be designed to move in self-regulated ways to answer almost any human purpose. Their programming can evolve as they learn ever more complex activities, such as how to walk on uneven terrain by trying various strategies of locomotion and taking note of successes.  Furthermore, they can be made to resemble human beings and to simulate human actions so that visually it may be difficult to distinguish their machinations from human activity.  In fact, it is desirable to fashion practical robot assistants with the size, shape, and flexibility of human beings in order to navigate our environments—rooms, stairs, and walkways--more easily.  Up to a point, machines are more appealing, and we relate to them more comfortably if they are given human-appearing facial features and appendages. ​[36]​  However, according to Masahiro Mori’s “uncanny valley” theory, if the creature looks too much like a human, people will “feel uncomfortable interacting with it,” because they will expect it to act like a human and be disappointed when it fails.​[37]​
	However, the fact that robots can potentially simulate human animate behavior as closely as one could wish makes it very tempting to suppose that ascribing true literal psychological ascriptions to them could not possibly be ruled out a priori.  William Lycan appeals to this fact when proposing what he calls “the goose-gander thesis,” the claim that any objection to the idea that machines could have qualitative or phenomenal experience applies with equal force to the claim that such experiences occur in human beings.  He contends that “it is…mere human chauvinism or at best fallacy to suppose otherwise.”​[38]​  He lists an impressive array of problems that face any materialistic ontology of the mental when trying to understand the ascription of experiences to human beings, such as Leibniz’-Law objections, “zombie” and “absent-qualia”-type puzzle cases, the seemingly intractable phenomenal and introspectible properties of sensations, and so on.  He argues that machines suitably constructed by human beings are no more problematic than humans themselves as subjects of qualitative experience ascriptions.
	I will make no attempt to deal with the difficulties that we allegedly face in ascribing experiences to human beings.  I will assume that when living subjects express their thoughts and feelings in gesture, speech and other types of animate behavior, we are justified in ascribing relevant psychological states to them on the basis of that behavior.  The purported conceivability of philosophical zombies, a vestige of dualism, can be safely ignored.  My focus will be on Lycan’s claim that ascribing P-states to nonliving machines poses no new difficulties.
	He begins defending his “goose-gander thesis” by describing an android that he calls Harry, who is an “expert human simulator…who through amazing miniaturization and cosmetic art is an entirely lifelike android” (QEM, p. 172). ​[39]​  Lycan goes on to say that Harry “is also a triumphant success of AI: his range of behavior-in-circumstances is equal to that of a fully acculturated and rather talented late 20th-century American adult.  No one would ever guess that he is not an ordinary person.”   They would never guess this from casual observation perhaps, although on closer examination they would learn that “his pattern of information flow…runs on considerably different hardware.”  Lycan, like Rosenberg, insists that it does not matter if the android is not made of warm, squishy stuff, like human beings, because “behavioral evidence does not require assumptions about the subject’s innards.”​[40]​  This supposition is common in discussions of the mental capacities of humanoid robots.  Alan Turing allowed that a computer could think even if constructed of synthetic materials.​[41]​  Oswald Hanfling claims that, "The facts about origin and internal materials would not and should not prevent these beings [robots] from being described and treated as people.”​[42]​
	However, the relevance of different possible types of “innards” should not be dismissed without careful consideration.  For instance, robot partisans typically assume that the basis of mentality is wholly neural and that it can be electronically reproduced in inorganic computer architecture.  Yet, there is considerable evidence that sensations and emotions in human beings are dependent upon the release of various chemicals (ligands) that bind to specific receptors in biological cells. Such biological processes of intercellular communication would be difficult, if not impossible, to replicate in the typical electro-mechanical milieu of a computer, although functional equivalents might conceivably be contrived in hardware.​[43]​  More importantly, if life is indeed required for mental states, then mentality will be limited to whatever materials can be organized into life forms.  Whether this would restrict organisms to carbon physiology we are presumably not in a position to know as yet.  Lycan seems to be on safe ground in thinking that if we watched the very “human” behavior of “humanoid creatures” from another planet with a biology quite different from ours, “we would still be justified in imputing human mental states to them” (QEM, p.174).  Even so, the LNM thesis maintains that if those creatures turned out to be nonliving, artificial devices constructed by alien engineers, we would not be similarly justified.
	Lycan observes that, although Harry is only “a computer with limbs,” some philosophers will readily grant that it has beliefs and possibly other propositional attitudes as well.  Nevertheless, Lycan acknowledges that the same philosophers who are willing to suppose that Harry has beliefs might be less willing to grant that it has feelings or qualitative experiences.  This reluctance puzzles Lycan because he thinks that ascribing phenomenal states to Harry ought to be relatively smooth sailing since its behavior is so much like our own.  He insists that the burden of coming up with a factor that defeats the claim that Harry is conscious rests on those who reject the claim, and he sees no reason to think that being nonliving is such a defeater.  After all, “Harry is a flawless human simulator and behaves, in any circumstance, just as a human might…. He provides his viewers with just the same sorts of behavioral evidence for mental ascriptions that you or I do –including ascriptions for qualitative experience.  So far as we have evidence for ascribing qualitative phenomenal states to each other, we have just as strong prima facie evidence for ascribing them to Harry” (QEM, p.173). 
	But the very point at issue is whether Harry provides us with “just the same sorts of behavioral evidence for mental ascriptions that you or I do.”  The notion of “same behavior” is not well defined in this context, and there is an important difference between a perceptually convincing behavioral imitation and the psychologically significant reproduction of animate behavior.  For instance, an accomplished actor can exhibit behavior representing sorrow and anguish, even though those emotions are not motivating his performance.  His intention is to reproduce the behavior, not the emotions.  Similarly, a humanoid robot with realistic human features could be programmed to exhibit behavior that represents sorrow and anguish without actually having any feelings at all.  Giving a machine a humanoid appearance and fashioning a simulation of human behavior produces only a kind of puppet, albeit an amazing one, with electronically controlled strings. ​[44]​  It seems that this is true so long as it is not a living organism that has formed purposes and motivations attuned to its own natural interests and concerns.
	Pointing this out will not impress behaviorists and others who insist that Harry’s very human performance constitutes psychologically significant behavior.  They will insist that such behavior in itself reveals motivating and explanatory interests and concerns.  Hanfling argues that if the robot is able to give reasons for what it does and what it does not do and for why it says one thing rather than another, then it seems that there is little difference between “speaking-behavior” and genuine speech.​[45]​  In fact, if we do not count Harry’s activity, which so much resembles human behavior, as psychologically significant behavior, we run the risk of opening ourselves to the charge of being dualistic about human psychology.  It can easily seem that we are splitting human activity into outer behavior and inner mental state, suggesting that Harry manifests the outer part but is missing the inner part.  This is clearly an unacceptably “dualistic” way to diagnose the problem with Harry.
	We can avoid the charge of dualism, however, if we point out that the difference between Harry and a living person is not that Harry is missing some “inner aura” of psychological phenomena.  The difference is that a robot is not the right kind of subject to exhibit animate behavior, and only such behavior bears the psychological significance we seek.  Only animate subjects bring with them the appropriate teleological background based on their natural needs and concerns and purposes.  A machine’s movements and vocalizations do not carry the psychological significance that human expressive gestures and avowals do, because its not being alive and naturally purposive undermines the claim that its behavior is sufficiently like ours to manifest a psychology of its own.  
	Lycan grants that Harry has neither needs like ours nor natural teleological origins, but he does not see that any “chauvinist thesis” restricting mentality to living creatures follows from this.  Teleology may be required for mentality and experience, but why should the origin of that teleology be relevant?  Teleology is teleology, whether natural or imparted (QEM, p.180).  Moreover, after Harry is activated, its program will be modified by what it encounters, so that over time its activities will be less dependent upon original human input (QEM, p.187).  Dennett similarly argues that the robot’s “derived intentions” may stem from “the clever engineering work of its designers…but maybe very indirectly.”  They may have installed high level principles from which the device works out practical strategies from its own “experience.”  He adds that even a human brain is “an artifact, and it gets whatever intentionality its parts have from their role in the ongoing economy of the larger system of which it is a part—or, in other words, from the intentions of its creator, Mother Nature (otherwise known as the process of evolution by natural selection.).” ​[46]​
	Leaving aside the anthropomorphic conceit regarding the evolution of human minds, it should be clear that, despite the robot’s practical education, whatever needs, wants, interests, and purposes are reflected in the robot’s behavior are ultimately those that develop naturally in forms of life, in this case, its designers.  A machine may be designed and constructed so that it has artificial drives or “desires” for play, for interacting with humans, and for completing chores, as well as sophisticated built-in functions, such as the important ability to “learn.”  However, this propensity to "learn" and to respond to its environment in goal-directed ways not only serves the purposes of the designers, but it is they who ultimately contrive that teleology.  Imparted teleology may be teleology, but what is at issue is the locus of genuinely purposive agency.  The ultimate psychological sources of teleological processes in robots are located in other human minds that are capable of generating their own purposes.  This fact undercuts the legitimacy of attributing thoughts, feelings, and intentions to robots.  The robotic system is nothing like a living agent that has autonomously developed its natural potential to produce a mature individual with curiosity, desire, and an independent "mind of its own.” There is nothing in Harry’s construction to suggest that it can truly care about the things that human beings care about, such as fresh air, a next meal, a drink, a friend, or a mate.  The device has no blood relations or sexual interests that could engender anxiety or passion; no struggles with disease; no birth into life with the expectation of growth, maturity, the unavoidable ravages of aging, and mortality.  We human beings recognize the significance of such matters for our well-being.  Harry can be made to act as if it cared about such things, but that is simulation, not realization.
	Contrary to Rosenberg’s own liberal tendencies, but in line with his own incisive critique of ELIZA, we have very good reason to think that a “Lebensform” is the key to mentality rather than a general “Seinsform.”  For instance, we can design a machine so that it simulates fear, but being afraid of a pit bull is not just a matter of “screaming,” “cringing” and turning to run at the sight of the dog.  What would be the point of a display of fear if the agent is a machine?  Can we understand how it could have a genuine interest in preserving itself, if it is not subject to pain and suffering, or death?  We can ask, with Rosenberg, does the machine “care” whether it is torn apart by a dog, as opposed to benign and careful disassembly for routine cleaning or the installation of a faster CPU.  We can make it behave differently in the two cases, but how do we go about making it have a genuine interest born of its own desires and concerns, as opposed to the external ones of the engineering team?  Harry’s “behavior” is an extremely convincing “simulation,” but its behavior has no psychological significance except for indicating whatever psychological state its designers want it to portray.  As Ziff says, “There are not psychological truths about robots but only about human makers of robots” (MM102).
	Objecting to Ziff’s claim that what the robot does "will depend on the whim of the man who makes it," Lycan points out that over time Harry will begin to take on quirks of its own through “chance physical defects,” “bugs” in its program, and “actual randomizers.”   So its behavior will not derive entirely from explicit design and, as a consequence, will “be almost completely unpredictable by people who knew only his original programming.”​[47]​  Nevertheless, this possibility does not increase our respect for Harry’s autonomy.  We can agree that with the passage of time Harry may be less and less reliable and predictable.  (Computers are like that.)  It may even do things that thwart human interests.  However, the crucial question is not whether the robot remains in human control or goes off script, but whether its operation is at any point controlled by a psychology of its own.  Ziff’s remark is intended to highlight the fact that ultimately the appropriateness of Harry’s reactions to its environment is ordained outside the robot in the minds of the engineers and others that produced him.  The machine is designed to fulfill the needs and interests of intelligent agents and, as such, is a useful extension of the human power to achieve ends.  A Mars probe can be designed to look for features of the planet that interest its makers; not those that interest the probe.  It can be said to calculate and to choose the optimal strategy for the purposes for which it is designed, but it cannot reason in service of purposes arising from its own nature.  In that important and fundamental respect it does not behave as humans do.
	Can we make Harry care about things that are appropriate to machines?  We could design the device to perform periodic recharging or lubrication to keep it running smoothly, and to become aggressive if thwarted.  But its smooth running is our concern, not its concern.  It has no concerns. This is why Rosenberg was reluctant to accord genuine intelligence to the ELIZA program.  Contrary to the frequent claims that the origins of subjects do not matter, who or what creates a subject, and by what means, does very much matter.  The exquisite sophistication of the way Harry mimics human behavior does not change that conclusion.  We have not been given any reason to think its astonishingly faithful reproduction of that behavior is sufficient to cross over into genuine self-interested reasoning and expressions of sensations and feelings.  
	Imagine RUR, a sophisticated robot, which exhibits behavior unexpected by its designers.  It is intended to be a docile and obedient household servant with cheerful mien.  However, over time its attitude and tone change, and it begins to act “grumpy,” “speak” rudely, and even to become unresponsive when asked to serve as bartender at evening parties after a day of chores.  The friends of robots would be tempted to say that, judging from its behavior, what moves RUR to behave as it does is anger and resentment, presumably at being treated unfairly and as less than equal to human beings.  (Recall Hanfling’s remark, quote above, that sophisticated androids might “express resentment” at being called “machines.”​[48]​)  Would the mere fact that it is in truth a machine prevent us from being justified in ascribing genuine hurt feelings in this case?
	The point of this fictional counterexample to the LNM Thesis is to show that, even if we stipulate that rude behavior is not part of the android’s original design, we are able to imagine a global change in its “personality” that is unpredicted and undesirable.  This heightens our sense that, as with Hal in Clarke’s story, some psychological force is at work in opposition to human will.  Nonetheless, in defense of the LNM Thesis it can be pointed out that we cannot simply assume—as we could with a living person--that the machine has feelings of fatigue, aching muscles, or boredom, to say nothing of injured self-respect, a desire for free time to do what it wants, or a need to be treated equally with human beings.  Other possible reasons for the observed change are available.  Barring sheer magic, something specific must have altered RUR’s controlling mechanisms.  Perhaps there was a serious flaw or failure in its programming or circuitry that is just now being revealed.  Maybe someone with engineering skills has secretly tinkered with the original program.  Cosmic radiation or nearby electrical influences or some as yet undiscovered cause might have changed the code.  Nothing in this greatly under-described scenario compels us to accept the conceivability of robot psychology, which we have already found reason to reject.
	Lycan conjures up other fictional variations to challenge the LNM thesis.  For instance, he vigorously rejects consideration of Harry’s origin or its artificiality as being relevant to whether or not it has a mind.
For suppose we were to synthesize billions of human cells and stick them together, making a biologic humanoid organism (We could either make a mature adult straightway or, what is technologically easier, make a fetus and nurture it).  We might further suppose that the resulting pseudo-human –let us call him Hubert—is a molecular duplicate of a pre-existing human being.  There is little doubt that such a creature would have qualitative experience; at least, if he did not, that would probably not be simply because of his early history (QEM, p. 175).
Lycan’s point is that Hubert would be, like Harry, artificial in origin, so his agency derives from an external mind, yet, we would not be tempted to deny that he has mental capabilities, since he is also a living human being.  
	It is important to understand that what undercuts the alleged mentality of robots is not their artificiality.  We can imagine that Hubert is a living organism artificially produced by human intelligence and design.  This could happen, for instance, if he were developed from synthesized but genetically human gametes in an artificial womb.  Even if he were a human being carefully designed and produced by genetic manipulation, there is no reason to think that he is at all like Harry the android so long as his agency and motivations develop in accordance with whatever biological principles govern human development generally.   This point is obscured by Lycan’s cavalier description of Hubert’s production in terms of “sticking cells together.”  If the cells are assembled, not like so many miniature Lego pieces, but in such a way that they form a growing, developing, and functioning organism, then, as in the case of any organism, there is no reason to attribute its agency to any other subject than itself.
	Another of Lycan’s science-fiction examples offers an intriguingly different approach to producing a conscious robot whose behavior is psychologically significant.  Henrietta is a human being whose entire central nervous system is under viral attack.  Surgeons start replacing her cerebral neurons, and “if you like, much of the rest of Henrietta” with prostheses and microchips that perform functions equivalent to neurons.  This successful replacement continues until there is no “wetware left,” and Henrietta’s “behavior is controlled entirely by (micro-)machinery, yet her intelligence, personality, poetic abilities, etc., and most importantly her perceptual acuity, sensory judgments and phenomenological reports remain just as always” (QEM, p. 174).  She of course would continue at each stage to proclaim the vividness of her inner life, insisting that she was unchanged phenomenologically.  Lycan insists that it would be boorish, as well as inaccurate, for a chauvinist to tell her that she is “cold and dead inside and is now no more sentient than a pocket calculator.”  Where could a credible line be drawn between the stages where she enjoys and where she lacks a phenomenology?  After the nth operation?  Wouldn’t the choice of n be arbitrary?
	What is significant about Henrietta’s case is that we are not to imagine simply that she simulates human macro-behavior the way Harry does.  Her case introduces the possibility of reproducing artificially the micro-level functioning of the human nervous system itself.  That suggests that her behavior would not be a mere simulation of human behavior and that her artificial parts could produce such behavior with no alteration of its psychological significance.  If we add to this the puzzling nature of gradual replacement of her nervous system, while stipulating that Henrietta herself is not aware of any change, we at least appear to have the ingredients of a plausible conscious robot story.​[49]​
	We can grant that miniature prostheses might be implanted in or at least attached to the human brain in such a way as to take over some of the functions of natural nerve cells.​[50]​  We may suppose that the first few implanted chips take on the rhythms of her own brain functions, so that they leave her biological integrity mostly intact.  When she reports pain, for example, we can assume that her memories, sensitivities, and the authenticity of her exclamations have not changed.  But what are we to say as more and more of her brain is replaced by artificial implants?
	Difficult questions arise as this process advances to the point where so much cortical tissue has been replaced that she counts as being “brain dead.”  My original response to this scenario was to draw the line at this point, concluding, in accordance with the LNM Thesis, that Henrietta, being brain dead, could no longer be considered a legitimate subject of psychological ascriptions.​[51]​  However, it is very difficult to speculate confidently in advance about our attitudes toward such a medically unlikely hybrid.  Conceivably, the death of her brain might not count as her death, since, contrary to what is presently possible, it seems that we are to imagine that artificial brain circuitry can maintain her mental functions and those of her heart, lungs, and other organs as well.  If the surgery replaced only her central nervous system, which would then control her living organs and limbs, she would be a cyborg, an organism that successfully integrates artificial and organic parts.  Instead of an organic brain directing prosthetic limbs, she would have an electronic control center in an otherwise organic body.  If such a cyborg counts as a living organism, then technically the LNM Thesis would not be violated.  We could say that, insofar as she is largely an organic system retaining the required needs, interests, and concerns that support the literal ascription of mental states, these would nevertheless be carried over from her original status as a fully biological creature.​[52]​
	However, if the replacement of her organs continued to the point where the flesh-and-blood Henrietta was replaced by a functional replica constructed of inorganic materials, the result would presumably be an android.  At that point the reasons we have offered for thinking that its behavior is not expressive of human psychology would apply.  Any biologically originated needs and concerns that might be represented in the replica’s behavior and vocalizations would no longer be appropriate to its new nonliving, electro-mechanical constitution.  In the later stages of the replacement process the robot may persist in voicing outdated information about Henrietta’s human motives and feelings, but they would become explanatorily irrelevant.  It no longer could have a genuine interest in food, water, air, relatives, friends, pleasure, affection, injury, and death.  It then might well be considered “cold and dead inside.”

VII
A Final Question about Future Androids
	If the LNM Thesis is correct, it would explain our current reluctance to regard machines as having mental states.  However, it is admittedly tempting to object that a better, and, indeed, the correct explanation for that reluctance is that the machines with which we are familiar are far too crude to exhibit the complex behavior required to express genuine mental states.  Moreover, the day may come when it will be difficult to resist describing the behavior of sophisticated robots in terms that we use to describe human beings.  Cynthia Breazeal of the MIT Media Lab has observed that people responded to even the bodiless and mechanistic face of Kismet “with tenderness and compassion.”​[53]​  The urge will be even stronger if these creations look human and engage in apt conversations.  Machines like Lycan’s Harry may serve our interests so well that we will seek them out for conversation and comfort.  In his book, Love and Sex with Robots: The Evolution of Human-Robot Relationships, David Levy foresees people entering into relationships with robots (even marriage), to provide much needed companionship.​[54]​
	Lycan and Hanfling likewise believe that if we begin to interact with such androids routinely and become comfortable using psychological language in dealing with them, it would be just wrong to deny that they have minds like our own.  Hanfling imagines, Edward, an artificial person (an a-person), who has lived discretely among us for years and whom we have never thought of as being anything other than a natural person.  He has a steady job and is a respected colleague, and we treat him just as we would a living human being.  If one day he disclosed his secret artificiality, Hanfling thinks that we would not take back everything we had said about his feelings.  “Someone who persisted in denying sentience to Edward and other a-people would be in the same position as a philosophical sceptic about ‘other minds’.  Such a sceptic would be stating—or purporting to state—beliefs that are belied by his own behaviour.”​[55]​  Hanfling believes that Wittgenstein would endorse this view of a-persons, citing his observation in the Investigations that it is difficult even to imagine that the people around us are automata and lack consciousness in the face of their ordinary behavior (PI 420).  Hanfling thinks it would be equally difficult in the case of Edward, despite his artificiality.
	However, a possible alternative view of the situation is that, despite Edward’s apparent revelations, we would persist in thinking him to be conscious because we would not yet be convinced that he is not alive.  He might have to resort to drastic measures to prove that he is just a machine.  For instance, he could demonstrate how easily and completely his inorganic structure can be dismantled, in which case we might well “take back” some of our empathetic beliefs and attitudes toward him.  Hanfling acknowledges that the internal structural difference between a-people and natural people might be thought to constitute important evidence for doubting that a-people are sentient.  To this “artifactist” prejudice he responds that 
the ascription of sentience to others is neither based on evidence nor subject to refutation by contrary evidence.  In suitable situations, we cannot help treating other creatures as sentient, and this is not dependent on their origins or internal composition.​[56]​
 Like Rosenberg, he insists that this counts in favor of the claim that androids that behaved as we do would count as persons.  If the artificial people behaved as humans do, so that we could not help treating them as we do human beings, then they would in fact count as subjects with minds.  We cannot cite the facts of our origins and internal composition as positive evidence of our having minds.  But neither can we cite the origins and internal composition of androids as negative evidence against minds.  Like Lycan, he believes that the two cases should be treated in parallel fashion.
	Although Hanfling’s conclusion conflicts sharply with the LNM Thesis, his reasoning overlooks the significance of the difference between human beings and androids.  In dismissing their differences in origin and internal composition he fails to appreciate the importance of the fact that one is alive and the other is not.  As we have seen, in that crucial respect skepticism about the existence of minds in nonliving artifacts is much more defensible than is skepticism about the existence of the mental capabilities of living human beings and animals.
	  Nonetheless, there is a further question to be addressed concerning the way our attitudes might change were we to interact with androids as fully as Hanfling envisages.  This question is different from the one with which we began our discussion.  Our original question was this: If engineers designed and created sophisticated androids whose physical behavior very closely resembled that of living human beings, would we be justified in ascribing psychological states to them on the basis of that behavior?  The answer that the LNM Thesis provides is “No, because, if they are not living beings, their behavior cannot be accounted for by genuinely psychological explanations. The urge to speak of androids as reasoning in support of their own interests and purposes or as having genuine emotions and sensations would be understandable but misguided.”
	However, there is an alternative view to consider.  If we were routinely to use psychological language of androids and otherwise treat them as we do persons, it might be argued that this would represent a philosophically interesting extension of psychological explanation to new types of subjects.  Even a Wittgensteinian might anticipate evolutionary changes in our natural reactions to such clever devices as Hal, Harry, and Edward.  If, as Hanfling suggests, these androids “engage our sympathies,” this might imply that the concept of mind was being stretched to accommodate the advent of artificial devices whose brains and bodies functioned so much like ours that they were now counted as genuine, though artificial, minds.  If we accepted that implication, the question whether machines can think and feel would turn out not to be the starkly true/false issue it first appears to be.   We originally asked whether engineers could create minds in nonliving machines.  Now we are asking whether repeated encounters with such machines could lead us to expand our concept of mind to include them as psychological subjects.  If that were to happen, Rosenberg’s view might be vindicated, although not in quite the way he anticipated.  For what we are now imagining is not that we might succeed in making machines so sophisticated that we have in fact created minds, but that our encounters with such machines have caused us to enlarge our conception of a "mind" and of a proper subject of psychological explanation. ​[57]​  
	We are, however, not forced to accept that outcome.  A less radical option is compatible with the LNM Thesis.  Wittgenstein acknowledged that psychological language can be legitimately used of inanimate things when he speaks of children ascribing thoughts and feelings to dolls.  Traditional dolls are “inanimate” in that they do not move and are not alive.  However, we can imagine a sophisticated modern model that cries out, winces, and asks to have the hurt place kissed.  Wittgenstein claims that saying a doll is in pain is a “secondary” or a derivative use of the concept of pain.  “Imagine a case in which people ascribed pain only to inanimate things; pitied only dolls!”(PI 282).  Presumably we can imagine some such language game; but the word ‘pain’ and the game would not have the same sense as does our primary sensation language.​[58]​  Ascriptions of psychological states can be said to have a primary sense when used in connection with the animate behavior of living animals and a secondary sense when applied to certain inanimate objects, perhaps because their resemblance to humans makes them apt for pretence.  Saying the doll is in pain implies that it is appropriate to pretend to give it aspirin, but not to really do so.  Children are usually not confused about what a doll is or what it feels.​[59]​
	Using this Wittgensteinian suggestion we might speak of robots in a special qualified manner, as “thinking,” “wanting,” or “feeling” to mark the fact that their “behavior”—which is in a sense animated-- bears superficial resemblances to our own. Some roboticists suggest that we should describe their creations in specially defined terms.  For instance, Cynthia Breazeal explains that she uses unqualified emotion words to refer “to the particular set of computational processes that are active in the system.  When the word ‘emotion’ appears with quotes, we are using it as an analogy to emotions in animals or humans.”​[60]​  Because the machines are nonliving and in that sense inanimate, scare quotes indicate that this language-game carries only some of the implications of our ordinary psychological talk about human beings.
	Along the same lines, Mehdi Dastani, John-Jules Meyer, and Bas Steunebrink at the Utrecht University are developing robots that use rules defining “emotions,” such as anger, hope, gratification, fear, and joy.  These are defined, not in terms of feelings, but in terms of a goal the robot is supposed to achieve and a plan by which it is to achieve it.  For instance, “’hope’ would be defined in terms of the system believing (based on sensory data) that by carrying out Plan A to achieve Goal B, Goal B will be achieved.  Conversely, ‘fear’ occurs when the system hopes to achieve Goal B by Plan A, but it believes that Goal B won’t be achieved after performing Plan A.  Using this sort of definition, ‘fear’ can help the robot recognize when it’s time to try a new tack.”  As Dastini explains, “We don’t really believe that computers can have emotions, but we see that emotions have a certain function in human practical reasoning….”​[61]​  Nico Frijda similarly explores the possibility of designing robots with “emotions.”  He too explains that he is concerned with the “informational content” of such a state, not the “raw feels.”  “The goal is not to simulate human emotions, but to construct a computer equivalent of emotions that is functional in the computer’s environment.”​[62]​
	It might be objected that the difference orthographically signaled between feelings and “feelings” or emotions and “emotions” is not as important as it might at first seem.  All such states are physical and functional arrangements within a subject that serve to guide that subject’s behavior, whether it is living or nonliving, human or robot.  However, this objection fails to take into consideration the moral implications of literal, unqualified attributions of feelings and emotions in the case of human beings.  That a person is in pain or is afraid or angry may well place requirements for understanding, sympathy, and action on observers that are quite different from what might be expected of those making use of robots.  Machines constitute property, probably quite expensive property, whose loss is not to be taken lightly.  However, such a loss is generally thought not to have the same implications as genuine pain, suffering, emotional anguish, and death.  There seems to be an unbridgeable chasm separating robotic machinery from living animals even as we strive to make one behave more like the other.  Of course, if the moral status of personhood were bestowed on rational androids in the future, as Rosenberg and others anticipate, then that final distinction would have evaporated.  However, assuming that this final step would be inevitable once androids are perfected ignores the strong case that can be made for the LNM Thesis.	
					    Douglas C. Long, Professor
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